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Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server Configure custom proxy use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy. Configure custom resolver. Janna Thompson - - Routledge. Why Global Justice Matters. Peter A. Redpath - - Telos: Critical Theory of the Contemporary Hedley Bull - - Columbia University Press. Justice, Authority, and the World Order. Walton - - Journal of Global Ethics 5 3 — Order and Justice in International Relations.
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Analyzing Global Governance Failure: A Philosophical Framework
International Justice or World Peace? Distributive Justice, Injustice and Beyond Justice. Downloads Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart. Sign in to use this feature. No keywords specified fix it. Global economic justice as a topic of moral philosophy and international law is back on the intellectual agenda and figures prominently in feuilletons, blogs and academic publications.
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A wave of recent studies by both international lawyers and moral philosophers on the dark side of economic globalization and the role of international law in this context is as such a remarkable phenomenon. The essay engages with diverging scholarly perspectives on global justice and international law as represented in the four volumes under review.
Three substantive questions structure the non-comprehensive sketch of the global justice debate: i Is the current international economic order unjust? The world-wide disorder affects all sectors. For centuries past, the prosperous countries have steadily grown richer at the expense of the underdeveloped countries, which have become progressively poorer. The workings of such an iron law were examined long ago, and are fully understood.
This system … is now vigorously condemned. What has happened to the world in the meantime? Are we now, 40 years later, back to square one? Can international lawyers as scholars productively engage at all with moral, social and economic issues, such as extreme poverty, structural exploitation and the effects of climate change?
And who should participate or take the lead in academic discussions on the international economic order, moral philosophers, economists, political scientists or lawyers? To begin with, legal approaches to the question of global justice can — at least at first sight — be differentiated from philosophical approaches in their degree of theoretical abstraction.
Justice and World Order: A Philosophical Inquiry - Janna Thompson - Google книги
Legal approaches generally take as their starting point an analysis of the legal material that might in one way or another contribute to the dark side of globalization or they focus on those elements of legal practice which have been considered to act as a remedy to the injustices created by economic globalization.
Garcia and John Linarelli, adopt such a legal practice-oriented perspective on global justice while others take a philosophical perspective. The latter often develop a specific standard on the basis of moral or political philosophy or economics against which they measure the outcomes of 20 years of economic globalization accelerated by the liberalization and facilitation of international trade and foreign investment induced by countless legal and political interventions by international institutions.
This is also the approach taken by Thomas Pogge and other moral philosophers who have intervened in the global justice debate, some of whom with a vehement critique of international law and some of its institutional manifestations. Shifting to a more legal perspective, she then sets out to investigate how the evolution and current state of international legal practice addresses these issues.
She thus refrains from abstract philosophical investigations. In this essay, I wish to engage with the diverging scholarly perspectives on international law and global justice as represented in the four volumes under review.
Three substantive questions will structure my selective and non-comprehensive sketch of the current debate on global justice and international law: i Is the current international economic order unjust? At least this seems to be the answer given by practically all the current contributions to this debate. Let me start with a black and white response.
Less black and white is Joel P. He expresses the view that moral philosophy alone is not helpful in answering intricate questions of justice regarding the rules of the global economic order. Accordingly, Trachtman criticizes moral philosophers, including Pogge, who argue in favour of redistributive justice for not seeking assistance from economists in their assessments of the global economic order.
Certainly, some emerging countries have benefitted from them, but the rules are not equitable … Contrary to the idea that globalization benefits everyone, there are losers on both sides, North and South. Even Fernando R. That this dire status quo entails moral responsibilities not only on the part of the governments of poor countries appears to be equally broadly accepted in the literature. For Pogge, the unfair global rules of the game lead to a massive violation of human rights, which creates a moral obligation on the part of the rich countries to alleviate world poverty.
While Pogge and Buchanan insist that global redistribution is required by principles of justice, Rawls, Miller and Nagel restrict principles of justice in the narrow sense to the state level. None of the latter three philosophers, however, believes that there are no moral obligations which extend beyond borders.
For Thomas Nagel, for instance, an obligation to redistribute wealth globally does not stem from principles of justice but from elementary considerations of humanity. Gould sides with the cosmopolitan requirement of global distributive justice in her chapter in Global Justice and International Economic Law. She proposes concrete practical directions for the realization of her claims, which focus on an enhanced system of implementing economic, social and cultural rights and the democratization of global governance mechanisms.
The contributions by Daniel Butt and Robert C. Hockett also see a need, from a philosophical perspective, for a redistribution of wealth on the global level; Daniel Butt on the basis of a global equality of opportunity standard and Robert C. Hockett with an analysis of the ethics of distribution in transnational contexts. The moral case for combatting extreme poverty is so obvious that a denial of moral obligations from a philosophical point of view would be counterintuitive.
It does not seem necessary and is perhaps even counterproductive to draw comparisons with Nazi crimes or abortion practices, as Pogge does, to convince the academic public that global inequality has scandalous and morally unbearable consequences for affected populations. If the absence of an efficient health system in African countries currently leads to situations where parents must let their Ebola-infected children die in an isolated hut without any help, care or personal contact, entire communities will be destroyed physically and morally.
More interesting for international lawyers working with or within international institutions seems to be the philosophical question of responsibilities of individuals for extreme poverty abroad. Here the late Marion Young had advanced a new and sophisticated model of responsibility for structural global injustices, like the one we are dealing with in the context of extreme poverty.
These processes are ongoing and ought to be transformed so that they are less unjust. Thus I share with others the responsibility to transform these processes to reduce and eliminate the injustice they cause. A central question emerging from the global justice debate on institutional and individual responsibilities is the extent to which international law and its institutions are considered a key mechanism to either cement or alleviate extreme poverty and staggering inequalities between the affluent and the poor countries. The following section attempts to find answers to these questions in the selected current contributions to this debate.
Recent debates over this issue are reminiscent of the controversial debates among the first generation of Third World scholars in the s over whether the newly independent states should place their hopes for a more equitable international economic order on international law or not. Many of these scholars believed that because the newly independent states were in the majority in the United Nations General Assembly, they could over time change the rules of the game.
In the context of the struggles over a New International Economic Order, the time to change international law had come for Bedjaoui in He expressed his cautious and sociologically reflected hope in a new international law in the following terms:. At such a time, one is conscious of the amazing yet fruitful contradiction contained in the law, the contradiction between its true nature and its real function. It seems to be evolutionary by nature yet conservative in function.
On the one hand it reflects a social reality which is changing and which it is obliged to try to keep up with, though there is bound to be some discrepancy and lag. In this it appears as something evolutionary. On the other hand, by being the expression of social relations, it fixes or stabilizes the social milieu of which it is the product. It thus reinforces and protects established practices, rejecting any change which might threaten them, and in this respect its function is conservative.
Like most of the authors from the Third World writing in the s Bedjaoui did not abandon the international legal project, 18 quite the contrary:. One of the fundamental roles of contemporary international law is to bring to light the mechanisms, whether avowed or camouflaged, blatant or subtle, which slow down, hamper or obstruct the advent of the new international economic order.
This brings out the futility and mystification involved in any attempt to separate legal analysis from the economic, social and cultural realities and values upon which legal rules rest. But what happened to the NIEO project and its attempt to rethink fundamental principles of the international economic system in order to remedy the unequal distribution of wealth and power resulting from the colonial past?
As Tourme-Jouannet shows in her historical reconstruction, non-reciprocity in trade relations, preference schemes, commodity producer cartels, common heritage — to name a handful of new concepts from that era — did not for various reasons live up to the expectations of the decolonized countries; partly because they were successfully watered down by the industrialized countries, and partly because more important structural disadvantages remained in place.
The weakening of the nation states brought about by globalization was perceived as bene ficial as it unharnessed the positive force of private actors. These thrived as did investment flows. Capital flows to developing countries grew six-fold in the six years from to Multinational firms played an increasingly decisive part in setting prices and directing strategies.
They came to control between 50 and 90 percent of world output, depending on the sector … Besides, from that time on, the most significant decisions in terms of development were no longer taken by the UN but by the Bretton Woods financial institutions, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD or the G8, where developing countries had no foothold.
At the same time, however, it would have been interesting to learn more about the exact fate of proposed innovations in international economic law, which were developed in the NIEO context. We just tend to accept that the NIEO is a history of political and legal failure, which as such does not seem to be of any continuing relevance. Dynamic developments in these fields are portrayed as potential remedies for a one-sided and unfair globalization. Instead of putting both the blame and the hope on international economic law and its institutions, a couple of authors focus on national conditions which produce extreme poverty.
Dunoff, writing in Global Justice and International Economic Law , for instance, joins those voices which hold that 20 years of preference systems for developing states had little effect on trade relations between developed and developing countries. At the same time, there seems to be a chicken and the egg problem: Is the lack of pro-poor policies of domestic institutions in many countries of the Global South a result of continuous economic and political interventions from Northern countries, international institutions structural adjustment , corrupt business practices of multinationals and unfair standards?
And even if the latter assumption were correct for some countries, would it be a justification for upholding unfair and damaging economic interventions from the North? Dunoff for his part makes clear that his insistence on domestic policies should not be understood as an argument against efforts to reform the trade system:. It may well be true that changes to existing trade rules can do much to address global poverty, and there can be little doubt that much more should and can be done to improve duty-free access for products from developing states, lower developed-state tariff peaks and tariff escalation in products of particular importance to developing states, and reduce developed state producer support.